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in Washington State
Hugh D. Spitzer*
Each state has two constitutions. First, the state constitution
frames the state government and declares the rights of citizens within
its borders. Next, the Federal Constitution frames the national
government and provides a Bill of Rights that both protects citizens in
their relationship with that federal entity and (after the Fourteenth
Amendment) protects citizens' relationships with their states in limited
but important ways.
This Article studies the problem of choosing constitu-
tions-particularly the choice between applying the national Bill of
Rights or a state constitution's declaration of rights. Many others have
presented arguments for and against the independent application of a
state's rights guarantees' or have classified and analyzed the various
theories of state constitutionalism in the shadow of the United States
Supreme Court.2 This examination focuses on practice rather than
* Hugh D. Spitzer teaches state constitutional law and local government law at the
University of Washington School of Law. He is a member of the law firm of Foster Pepper &
Shefelman PLLC.
1. Substantial literature exists on the value and theoretical soundness of applying state
declarations of rights independently of the Bill of Rights. A few of the better-known articles
include William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No
Anchor: Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979);
James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992);
Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal
and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985); Robert J. Williams, In the Supreme Court's
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV.
353 (1984); Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism:
Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and
Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993). For an excellent overview
of the basic differences between the federal Constitution and state constitutions, see G. Alan Tarr,
Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1123 (1992); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of
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theory: specifically, how the Washington State Supreme Court has
applied its formal doctrine on the role of the State's Declaration of
Rights' and how that court has characterized and applied six criteria
it prescribed in State v. Gunwall4 to assist Washington lawyers and
judges in briefing and interpreting Washington's Declaration of Rights
when the national Bill of Rights also applies. After briefly reviewing
the history of state constitutionalism, this Article analyzes 108
Washington Supreme Court opinions5 that referred to Gunwall during
the 11 years after that case was decided. It suggests that a surprising
divergence between theory and practice has occurred and recommends
simple steps to make the Washington court's application more
consistent with its doctrine.6
I. ONE NATION, FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS
State constitutions in most eastern seaboard states have existed
longer than the Federal Constitution.7 In several instances, state
governments were formalized more than a decade before the Articles
of Confederation were replaced with the federal document that turned
a loose amalgam of sovereign states into a nation. State declarations of
rights are still older than the Bill of Rights, which was promised to
ensure the national Constitution's passage,8 and received approval two
years after the Constitution itself. Both the Federal Constitution's
Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983-86 (1985);
Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 645-52 (1987).
3. See WASH. CONST. art. 1.
4. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). See Appendix infra for the text of the criteria.
5. The 90 Washington Courts of Appeals opinions that mentioned Gunwall during the same
period are briefly reviewed in this article.
6. For a fascinating analysis of selected Washington Supreme Court criminal case opinions
citing Gunwall, see Laura L. Silva, State Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in Washington Since
State v. Gunwall: "Articulable, Reasonable and Reasoned" Approach? 60 ALBANY L. REV. 1871
(1997).
7. Some jurisdictions have been governed by basically the same constitution since the
Revolution. Others underwent revision and replacement in the Nineteenth Century. See generally
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1980); Robert
F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's Radical 1776
Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 541 (1989).
8. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 219-45 (1990); Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten
Amendments, in LEONARD LEVY & DENNIS MAHONEY, THE FRAMING AND RATIFYING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 305-16 (1987); Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in




frame of government and its Bill of Rights were modeled on earlier
state experiments. 9 However, state and national rights declarations
have a much older heritage, descending directly from earlier colonial
charters and bills of rights, the English Bill of Rights of 1689,10 the
Magna Carta and beyond.11
When a person asserts that state or local government has abridged
his or her rights, upon which constitution should he or she rely? Well
into the Twentieth Century, citizens periodically relied upon state
declarations of rights. 2  But the federal government's explosive
midcentury growth and its successful role in ending the Depression,
winning World War I, and ensuring the civil rights of minorities,
gave the federal government and its Supreme Court tremendous
visibility and moral power."3 In the political sphere, national trans-
portation, social services, environmental, and civil rights programs had
a huge impact on state agendas in the 1960s and 1970s. In the legal
sphere, at least two postwar career generations of lawyers and judges
were educated and practiced under a system that emphasized federal
constitutional jurisprudence. While state constitutional thinking
continued to develop vibrantly in areas relating to the structure and
powers of state government, 14 scholars, lawyers, and judges working
on civil rights and liberties issues focused almost exclusively on the
9. See WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1987); ADAMS, supra note
7, at 289-91; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 26-27, 33-38, 58-91 (1977).
10. ADAMS, supra note 7, at 8-13; SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 1-23.
11. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 1-34 (1968); SCHWARTZ,
supra note 9, at 2-52; M.E. BRADFORD ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19 (1993); DONALD S. LUTZ,
POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980). For an example of detailed historical sleuthing on one item in
the Bill of Rights, the origin of the "right to bear arms" in the Twelfth Century, see Roy
Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment,
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Rosser v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E. 257, 257 (Va. 1933); State ex rel. Clithero
v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 522-23, 293 P. 1000, 1001 (1930); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash.
171, 184, 203 P. 390, 395 (1922); State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 517, 145 P. 470, 471 (1915);
Avery v. Vermont Elec. Co., 54 A. 179, 179-80 (Vt. 1903); State v. Fabbri, 98 Wash. 207, 210-
11, 167 P. 133, 135 (1917). But see G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1097, 1100-06 (1997), in which Professor Tarr describes empirical studies
suggesting that while reliance on state rights guarantees in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Century was steady, it was by no means frequent.
13. See Mosk, supra note 1, at 1083-88.
14. See James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 819 (1991).
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Federal Bill of Rights. 5 That began to change, however, as the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts cut back on the Warren era's advances
in civil liberties and civil rights. Then, sparked by Justice William
Brennan 6 and building on earlier groundwork by others,17 the legal
community in the 1980s embarked on a "new judicial federalism" that
rediscovered and reemphasized the rich history of state declarations of
rights.'8  Ironically, the same "conservative" Court has recently
underscored the importance of state powers and reinforced the limits
on the federal government's constitutional powers.' 9 But as Rutgers
Professor Robert F. Williams has pointed out, that 20-year-old
movement is no longer "new."20  In state after state,2' supreme
15. Perhaps the overwhelming focus on the Federal Constitution was reinforced by law
teachers and judges themselves, whose outpouring of books, articles, and decisions concerning
federal rights in the 1960s made them part of a truly noble cause while simultaneously promoting
their individual careers. After all, many judges and professors have attended national law schools
and then clerked for federal judges. When they begin their teaching careers, they quickly realize
that advancement from a regional to a national law school (or from the state courts to the federal
bench) is more effectively enhanced by useful scholarship, decisions, and recognition on national
topics. Attention to topics of state law and constitutions can be useful, but does little to improve
one's national standing. Former New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Charles G. Douglas, III,
eloquently made this point in State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1123, 1147 (1978).
16. See generally Brennan, supra note 1. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535, 548-53 (1986).
17. See Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism's First
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii, xiv (1996), pointing out the early work of Robert Force in
State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125
(1969). See also Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54
VA. L. REV. 928 (1968); Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon,
49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970).
18. See generally Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). The heightened importance of state courts and state
constitutional law led to many publications and law review symposia dedicated to those topics.
See, e.g., EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INAUGURAL ISSUE (Nat'l Ass'n
of Att'ys Gen. ed., 1988); SUSAN FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1987); Symposium: The Washington Constitution, 8 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 157 (1985); Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions and
Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 16 PUBLIUS 141 (1986), reprinted in
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 599 (1986); State Constitutional Commentary, 59 ALBANY L. REV.
1539 (1996). Both Temple Law Review and Rutgers Law Journal have for several years provided
annual symposia on state constitutional topics. See, e.g., Emerging Issues in State Constitutional
Law, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1035 (1995); NINTH ANNUAL ISSUE ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 28 RUTGERS L. J. 783 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
20. Williams, supra note 17; Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitu-
tions-Beyond the "New Federalism", 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157 2, at vi (1985).
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courts today rely on their own constitutions to protect individual
liberties in ways that go beyond the "federal floor" provided by the
elements of the Bill of Rights incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment.2
II. WASHINGTON STATE: "TURNING TO OUR OWN
CONSTITUTION FIRST"
Washington's Supreme Court was an early participant in the
resurgence of state constitutional rights jurisprudence. In State v.
Ringer, a 1983 case involving the warrantless search of a car based on
an aroma of marijuana emanating from the vehicle,23 Justice James
Dolliver noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had held similar searches
to be unprotected under the Fourth Amendment.24 But rather than
engaging in a further Fourth Amendment analysis, the court deter-
mined, 7-2, to focus on Article I, Section 7 of the Washington
Constitution, its origins, and the law of search and seizure at the time
Washington's constitution was adopted in 1889.2' Based on a
detailed analysis, the court decided "to return to the protections of our
own constitution and to interpret them consistent with their common
law beginnings,"26 holding that the search was impermissible under
Washington's Declaration of Rights.27
But the Ringer decision carried with it a sharp dissent by former
Justice Dimmick, echoing a common criticism by those who see
judicial choice of state declarations of rights as little more than result-
oriented decisions caused by dissatisfaction with a conservative trend
on the United States Supreme Court.28 She wrote: "Once again we
confound the constabulary and, by picking and choosing between state
21. See Collins et al., supra note 18. For an interstate comparison with respect to a specific
topic, see David B. Kopel et al., The Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State
Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995).
22. See Collins et al., supra note 18, at 600-01. It is important to remember that the United
States Supreme Court's "partial incorporation" of the Bill of Rights has provided for only a
piecemeal extension of federal constitutional protections to actions of the states. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 567-69 (1978). Accordingly, citizens must rely on
their state declarations of rights for the remaining protections.
23. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part by State v. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d 144, 150-53, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1986).
24. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 689, 674 P.2d at 1242.
25. See id. at 690, 674 P.2d at 1242-43.
26. See id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247.
27. See id. at 699-700, 674 P.2d at 1247-48.
28. See generally Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 1.
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and federal constitutions, change the rules after the game has been
played in good faith. 29
Nevertheless, the Washington court soon relied again on the
State's Declaration of Rights, holding in State v. Coe that Article I,
Section 5 of the Washington Constitution barred a trial judge's gag
order on the broadcast of certain lawfully obtained tape recordings.3"
In an opinion in which five of his colleagues concurred, former Justice
Robert Utter gave the following rationale for the decision's reliance on
"bona fide separate, adequate, and independent" state grounds; rather
than on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning:3
Whether the prior restraint was constitutionally valid or invalid
should be treated first under our state constitution, for a number of
reasons. First, state courts have a duty to independently interpret
and apply their state constitutions that stems from the very nature
of our federal system and the vast differences between the federal
and state constitutions and courts. Second, the histories of the
United States and Washington Constitutions clearly demonstrate
that the protection of the fundamental rights of Washington citizens
was intended to be and remains a separate and important function
of our state constitution and courts that is closely associated with
our sovereignty. By turning to our own constitution first we grant
the proper respect to our own legal foundations and fulfill our
sovereign duties. Third, by turning first to our own constitution we
can develop a body of independent jurisprudence that will assist this
court and the bar of our state in understanding how that constitu-
tion will be applied. Fourth, we will be able to assist other states
that have similar constitutional provisions develop a principled,
responsible body of law that will not appear to have been construct-
ed to meet the whim of the moment. Finally, to apply the Federal
Constitution before the Washington Constitution would be as
improper and premature as deciding a case on state constitutional
grounds when statutory grounds would have sufficed ... Y
29. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 703, 674 P.2d at 1250 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
30. 101 Wash. 2d 364, 373-78, 679 P.2d 353, 359-61 (1984).
31. See id. at 378, 675 P.2d at 361. Justice Utter expressly referred to the then-recent
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that it would decline to review a state court's holding under its own constitution only "[i]f the
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds." The United States Supreme Court's recognition
of the independent authority of state courts to interpret and apply their own constitutions was
earlier confirmed in PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74- (1980).
32. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 373-74, 679 P.2d at 359.
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Coe was a strong affirmation of the primacy of the Washington
Constitution. But Justice Utter soon argued in two law review
articles33 that state courts should not ignore federal constitutional
questions, but should evaluate similar state and federal provisions on
a dual track, in part to ensure that state constitutional jurisprudence
develops in a principled, methodical and nonresult-oriented way.
Justice Utter's support for the use of consistent criteria to evaluate state
declarations of rights in the context of federal rulings34 may well have
been an attempt to answer the criticism by Justice Dimmick and others
that independent state jurisprudence was prone to unprincipled
decision-making. Indeed, the need to respond to this critique was
expressly mentioned when, in the influential Gunwall case in 1986, 35
the Washington court unanimously adopted a step-by-step criteria
approach in an opinion authored by former Justice James Andersen.36
Justice Andersen asserted that "[m]any of the courts now resorting to
state constitutions rather than to analogous provisions of the United
States Constitution simply announce that their decision is based on the
state constitution but do not further explain it."37  To "establish [a]
• . .principled basis for repudiating federal precedent" and to "furnish [a]
. . . rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state
decisional law," the Gunwall court adopted the following six "nonexclu-
sive neutral criteria . . . relevant to determining whether, in a given
situation, the constitution of the State of Washington should be
considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the
United States Constitution" :38
1. The textual language of the state constitution;
2. Significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the
federal and state constitutions;
3. State constitutional and common law history;
4. Preexisting state law;
33. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 1025 (1985); Utter & Pitler, supra note 2.
34. Utter & Pitler, supra note 2, at 654-64.
35. 106 Wash. 2d at 59-61, 720 P.2d at 811-12.
36. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13. The Gunwall criteria were consciously modeled on
an approach suggested by New Jersey Justice Alan B. Handler a year earlier. See id. at 61 n.9,
720 P.2d at 812 n.9 (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964-67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J.,
concurring)).
37. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 60, 720 P.2d at 811-12 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13. The Gunwall criteria are listed here in summary form.
The full text of the criteria as set forth in Gunwall is contained at Appendix A to this Article.
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5. Differences in structure between the federal and state constitu-
tions; and
6. Matters of particular state interest or local concern.
In the Gunwall opinion, Justice Andersen went on to state that the six
criteria were aimed at the following:
(1) suggesting to counsel where briefing might appropriately be
directed in cases wherein they are urging independent state constitu-
tional grounds; and (2) helping to insure that if this court does use
independent state constitutional grounds in a given situation, it will
consider these criteria to the end that our decision will be made for
well founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting our notion
of justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United
States Supreme Court.9
Although Gunwall outlined the criteria that Washington's court
wanted counsel to use in presenting arguments based on the State's
Declaration of Rights, the Gunwall opinion did not answer some
critical questions that were imbedded in Justice Andersen's explanation
of why the court laid down the six criteria. Did the court really
believe that the state's own constitution came first, as it had stated in
Ringer and Coe, and were the Gunwall criteria meant principally to
encourage proper briefing so that a Washington rights jurisprudence
could be fully developed? Did the court intend that independent
interpretation of Washington's constitution would enable the court on
occasion to reach different conclusions than the United States Supreme
Court, even when the language of the two rights documents were
similar? Or did the court mean, as implied by Justice Andersen's
language about "repudiating federal precedent,"4 that the United
States Supreme Court had binding jurisdiction over the Washington
Constitution when similar provisions were involved? Was the State's
Declaration of Rights to be used only in special circumstances when
counsel could demonstrate that it was appropriate?
The answers to these questions were by no means obvious, both
because members of Washington's court likely had differing views and
because those views reflected a national debate over how state judges
should apply their constitutions. The contrasting approaches have
been well-documented by legal scholars.4' The "primacy" approach
39. Id. at 62-63, 720 P.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 60, 720 P.2d at 812.
41. See Pollock, supra note 2; Utter & Pitler, supra note 2; see also Linda White Atkins,
Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution, 62 WASH. L. REV. 569, 573-75 (1987);
Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State
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emphasizes a State's declaration of rights; and in its pure form, a court
will not move to a federal constitutional analysis unless a party is
found to be without protection under the state constitution.42 At the
other end of the spectrum is the "lock-step," "absolute harmony," or
"deferential" approach, which assumes that in all circumstances a state
constitution will be interpreted coextensively with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provisions in the Bill of
Rights.43 In between these two extremes are various shades of gray:
the "presumptive" approach assumes that state courts will follow the
national Court unless a strong argument to the contrary is made, while
the "interstitial" or "supplemental" approach will apply the state
constitution, but only when there are gaps in the Supreme Court's
decisions or jurisprudence. The "dual sovereignty" method advocated
by Justice Utter simultaneously looks at both constitutions, with the
notion that doing so affords state courts an opportunity to both learn
from (and teach) the federal judiciary, and to develop independent state
interpretations while using the best in the national court's thinking.
This approach also provides the Supreme Court the opportunity to see
reasoning by state courts on federal constitutional issues not yet
decided at a national level."
Gunwall and the criteria method have been continuously criticized
in law reviews as unavoidably leading to a presumptive approach that
does not give sufficient respect and deference to a state's own
constitution.45 This is more than an academic debate. At its root, a
court's decision on which approach to use makes a big difference in
how seriously it takes its State's constitution and how effective
litigants' recourse to state declarations of rights will be. But the
advantages and disadvantages of each approach have already been well-
documented and argued. 46  Rather than entering into this debate, I
will examine how Washington's court itself has characterized what it
meant to do in Gunwall and how that case has been used in practice
during the eleven years since it was published.
Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635 (1994).
42. Utter & Pitler, supra note 2, at 647; State v. Moylett, 836 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Or. 1992);
State v. Traylor, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992).
43. Utter & Pitler, supra note 2, at 645.
44. Utter, supra note 33, at 1047-50.
45. See generally Atkins, supra note 42; see also James W. Talbot, Rethinking Civil Liberties
Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099 (1991); Robert F. Williams,
In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent
State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997).
46. See, e.g., the articles listed supra, in notes 1, 2, 17, 33 and 41.
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III. GUNWALL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Eleven Years of Gunwall
First, it is helpful to examine the raw data. Between June 12,
1986, when the Gunwall decision was issued, and June 12, 1997, the
case was cited in 108 separate Washington Supreme Court opinions
and 96 opinions issued by the State's three Courts of Appeals. During
that period, other Washington appellate decisions dealt with interpreta-
tions of both the federal and the state constitutions. But the 204
opinions reviewed for this survey provide a good sample, particularly
because the reference to Gunwall in each decision means that the court
was considering whether and how to apply the Washington Constitu-
tion when an analogous federal provision also applied.
Of the 108 supreme court rulings, the vast majority involved
criminal proceedings. That is not surprising, given that declarations
of rights protect persons from government action and criminal filings,
which are a common and powerful form of governmental activity
against an individual's behavior. Only thirty of the supreme court
opinions involved civil matters; some of those related to speech and the
press,47  defamation, religious freedom,49  licenses, °  entitle-
ments,5 ' industrial insurance, 2 and custody,5" but a number were
indirectly connected to law enforcement and regulatory matters, such
as cases concerning the forfeiture of drug property, 4 regulations on
lewd conduct,"5 and housing code enforcement.5 6  Of the 108 opin-
47. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 131 Wash. 2d 573, 931 P.2d 1123, cert.
denied, 1185 S. Ct. 175 (1997); Collier v. Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993);
Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 113 Wash. 2d 818, 783 P.2d 1065 (1989); Southcenter
Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989).
48. See Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash. 2d 368, 922 P.2d 1343 (1996); LaMon v.
Butler, 112 Wash. 2d 193, 770 P.2d 1027 (1989).
49. See Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997); First Covenant
Church v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992); Witters v. Commission for the Blind,
112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989).
50. See Foley v. Department of Fisheries, 119 Wash. 2d 783, 837 P.2d 14 (1992).
51. See Conrad v. University of Wash., 119 Wash. 2d 519, 834 P.2d 17 (1992); Bedford
v. Sugarman, 112 Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989).
52. See Harris v. Department of Labor & Indus., 120 Wash. 2d 461, 843 P.2d 1056 (1993);
Holbrook v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 118 Wash. 2d 306, 822 P.2d 271 (1992); Clark v. Pacificorp, 118
Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
53. See State v. Carver, 113 Wash. 2d 591, 781 P.2d 1308 (1989).
54. See Tellevik v. Real Property, 120 Wash. 2d 68, 838 P.2d 111 (1992); Rozner v.
Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 804 P.2d 24 (1991).
55. See Soundgarden v. Eikenberry, 123 Wash. 2d 750, 871 P.2d 1050 (1994); Forbes v.
Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 929, 785 P.2d 431 (1990); O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 749
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ions, more than half (62 cases, or 57%) declined to consider state
constitutional arguments because of inadequate briefing.17 Ten cited
Gunwall solely for its substantive holdings on electronic eavesdropping,
and two are unclear about why Gunwall was cited."8 This leaves only
thirty-four cases (32%) in which the court fully undertook the question
of how to interpret a state constitutional provision that has a federal
counterpart.
During the period studied, ninety-six Washington Supreme Court
cases cited Gunwall for its procedural precepts on how to use the
Washington Constitution. All of these cases involved claims based on
thirteen of the thirty-five sections of the Declaration of Rights,
occasionally claiming violations of multiple sections. The most
frequently cited provisions were those concerning privacy/search and
seizure,59 due process,6" freedom of speech,6 privileges and immu-
nities,62  self-incrimination/double jeopardy,63  rights of the
accused/speedy trial,64 and jury trial. 6  These provisions were raised
by parties as shown in Table 1, below.
P.2d 142 (1988).
56. See Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 868 P.2d 134 (1994); Margola Assoc. v.
Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993); Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d
1 (1993).
57. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. The 62 cases in this enumeration do not
include Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996), because, while the court
asserted a lack of adequate state constitutional briefing, the opinions nevertheless proceeded to
analyze the Washington constitutional issues. Id. at 590-91, 919 P.2d at 1221-22. See infra notes
126-35 and accompanying text. The rejection rate for inadequate briefing was somewhat higher
in the noncriminal cases: 21 of 30, or 70%.
58. State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash. 2d 51, 126, 804 P.2d 577, 616 (1991) (involving WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22) (Dore, J., dissenting); State v. Whelchel, 115 Wash. 2d 708, 726, 801 P.2d
948, 957 (1990) (involving WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22).
59. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
60. See id. § 3.
61. See id. § 5.
62. See id. § 12.
63. See id. § 9.
64. See id. § 22.
65. See id. § 21.
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Table 1
Washington Constitutional Provisions Most
Frequently Raised in 96 State Supreme
Court Cases Citing Gunwall Factors
June 12, 1986-June 12, 1997
Provision Relied Upon by Party Frequency
Art. I, § 7 (Privacy/Search & Seizure 22
Art. I § 3 (Due Process) 19
Art. I § 5 (Freedom of Speech) 14
Art. I § 12 (Privileges & Immunities) 11
Art. I § 9 (Self-Incrim./Double Jeopardy) 10
Art. I § 22 (Rights of Accused, Speedy Trial) 9
Art. I § 21 (Jury Trial) 8
Art. I § 11 (Freedom of Religion) 4
Other 15
(Note: Some cases involved more than one provision.)
Although Gunwall and subsequent decisions made it clear that the
privacy/search and seizure protections of article I, section 7, are
distinctly different from and stronger than the Fourth Amendment, 66
failure to adequately brief the state grounds led the Washington
Supreme Court to ignore those claims in ten of the twenty-two cases
in which they were made. The court generally has viewed the state
and federal due process provisions as similar in scope and content,67
but because of briefing failures, the court has directly addressed and
analyzed the state provision in only four of the nineteen cases in which
it was asserted.
66. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 580, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990); Seattle
v. Messiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456-58, 755 P.2d 775, 776-78 (1988); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.
2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986).
67. See, e.g., State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash. 2d 467, 481, 880 P.2d 517, 524 (1994); State
v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 302-04, 831 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (1992).
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Of the thirty-four cases in which the court addressed state
constitutional claims that had been asserted, thirteen can be said to
have held that the relevant state provisions were to be interpreted
coextensively with analogous sections of the Bill of Rights.6"
In another thirteen cases, the court independently or differently
interpreted the state provisions but reached the same results that it
found were dictated by United States Supreme Court's holdings on
analogous sections of the Federal Constitution.69 In a pair of recent
three-strikes-you're-out cases, the court applied several state provisions
identically with the federal sections,7" and one section independent-
ly,71 but the results were still the same under both constitutions.
68. This author views the following cases as having interpreted the state constitutional
language in a manner essentially identical to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
analogous provisions of the Federal Constitution: Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash. 2d 368,
922 P.2d 1343 (1996) (WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5); State v. Gocken, 127 Wash. 2d 95, 896
P.2d 1267 (1995) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9); State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 882 P.2d 747
(1994) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9); State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash. 2d 467, 880 P.2d 517
(1994) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3); State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3); State v. Hopper, 118 Wash. 2d 151, 822 P.2d 775 (1992) (WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 22); State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 7); State v. Earls, 116 Wash. 2d 364, 805 P.2d 211 (1991) (WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 9);
In re Teddington, 116 Wash. 2d 761, 808 P.2d 156 (1991) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); State v.
Straka, 116 Wash. 2d 859, 810 P.2d 888 (1991) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3); Ford Motor Co. v.
Barrett, 115 Wash. 2d 556, 800 P.2d 367 (1990) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12); State v. Reece, 110
Wash. 2d 766, 757 P.2d 947 (1988) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5); State v. Box, 109 Wash. 2d 320,
745 P.2d 23 (1987) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3).
69. Ino Ino, Inc. v. Bellevue, 132 Wash. 2d 103, 937 P.2d 154 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 856 (1998) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5); Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 935
P.2d 1272 (1997) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11); Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash. 2d 583, 919 P.2d
1218 (1996) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 917 P.2d 563
(1996) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); State v. Carter, 127 Wash. 2d 836, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) (WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7); State v. Hobble, 126 Wash. 2d 283, 892 P.2d 85 (1995) (WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 21); State v. Goucher, 124 Wash. 2d 778, 881 P.2d 210 (1994) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7);
State v. Corliss, 123 Wash. 2d 656, 870 P.2d 317 (1994) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); State v.
Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229, 830 P.2d 658 (1992) (WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7); Southcenter Joint
Venture v. Nat'l Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989) (WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 5); State v. Irizarry, 111 Wash. 2d 591, 763 P.2d 432 (1988) (WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 22); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21,
22).
70. State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 665, 672, 679-80, 921 P.2d 473, 479, 482, 486-
87 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1563 (1997) (WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12, 21, 23); State v.
Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d 697, 921 P.2d 495 (1996) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21).
71. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d at 674, 921 P.2d at 483-84 (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14);
Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d at 712, 921 P.2d at 502 (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14).
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This leaves only eight cases (almost all characterized by sharply
split opinions) that were analyzed independently and in which results
differed from the outcomes under the Federal Constitution.72
There is a pattern to the Washington court's application of the
Washington Constitution when analogous federal language also
pertained.
Table 2
Washington Constitutional Provisions Raised in
Thirty-Nine Claims After Full Gunwall Briefing





Provision Relied Upon Identically Same Result Different Result
Art. I., § 7 (Privacy/Search) 2 6 5
Art. I., § 3 (Due Process) --
Art. I., § 5 (Free Speech) 2 2
Art. I., § 12 (Privileges & I--
Immunities)
Art. I., § 9 (Self-Incrim./ 3-
Double Jeopardy)
Art. I., § 22 (Rights of 1 2
Accused, Speedy Trial)
Art. I., § 21 (Jury Trial) 2 3 1"
Art. I., § 11 (Freedom of 1 2-
Religion)
Other 2 3
a. See discussion in Note 72.
(Note: Some cases involved more than one provision.)
72. Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 7); First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 229, 840 P.2d 174, 188-89 (1992)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, distinguishing the issues from those that had been previously decided
by the United States Supreme Court and did not definitively (and differently) rule on a case
equivalent to First Covenant until Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)); State v. Boland, 115
Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); Bedford v. Sugarman, 112
Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112
Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, 725 (1989) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21, stating that the United
States Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue in question-see infra notes 116-122 and
accompanying text); Witters v. State Comm'n for Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989)
(WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 7); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 7).
Which Constitution?
In the opinions in which the court applied the state and federal
provisions identically, the due process claim was involved most
often-in five cases." Although Justice Utter persistently noted that
the court never addressed the striking difference between the history
and the wording of Washington's Privileges and Immunities Clauses
and the equal protection language of the Fourteenth Amendment to
which it was compared,74 his colleagues chose to read them identically
in three of the cases. Two opinions involved speech,76 and three
concerned the rights of the accused.77 Among the opinions that
applied the state and federal provisions independently yet reached
similar results, article I, section 7 figures most prominently (six
cases),7" reflecting the fact that Washington's search-and-seizure
language has received the most jurisprudential attention from lawyers
and judges. Similarly, of the eight cases in which the court indepen-
dently applied Washington's constitution and arrived at a different
result than the federal approach, five involved article I, section 7.79
Two of the eight cases concerned religious freedom claims and one
involved trial by jury."0 Thus, when one views all ninety-six Wash-
ington Supreme Court opinions citing Gunwall for its procedural
methodology during the eleven years after it was issued, only two of
twenty-one sections of Washington's Declaration of Rights with
analogous federal constitutional counterparts81  were interpreted
independently. These interpretations led to differing results from those
that would have prevailed had only the United States Constitution
been applied.
Furthermore, during the same eleven-year period there appear to
have been no cases in which, (1) both the Declaration of Rights and
the Bill of Rights applied, (2) the court found them to be substantially
the same, and (3) the court chose to interpret the Washington
provision differently than the United States Supreme Court.
73. See supra note 68-69.
74. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 282-91, 814 P.2d at 661-66; Ford Motor Co.,
115 Wash. 2d at 570-71, 800 P.2d at 375.
75. See supra note 68, and infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See cases cited in supra note 69.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3-5, 7-14, 16, 18, 21-25, 28, 30, 31.
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The experience in ninety-six opinions of the State Courts of
Appeals8 2 was somewhat different. In only one-third (thirty-five
cases) were constitutional arguments rejected for inadequate briefing.
Six cited Gunwall solely for its substantive holdings on electronic
eavesdropping. 3 Of the remaining fifty-five (which apparently were
adequately briefed), thirty-five opinions found no material difference
between the Declaration of Rights provision cited and the Bill of
Rights, or found some difference but held that the result was the same.
The implications of this data are discussed below, particularly the
surprising number of rejections based on faulty briefing and the small
number of State Declaration of Rights sections that are interpreted
differently from analogous federal constitutional language and then lead
to different results. To better understand the information about the
application of the Gunwall criteria, it would be useful to review how
the state court itself has characterized what it meant to do in Gunwall.
B. Primacy in Theory
First in Ringer and Coe, and then in many of the cases citing
Gunwall during the last decade, the Washington court forcefully
underscored the principle that when properly briefed, issues would be
analyzed on the basis of the State Declaration of Rights before turning
to analogous sections of the Bill of Rights.8 4 This position has been
taken by almost all of the justices writing opinions on the matter. An
early post-Gunwall example is the 1988 case of Seattle v. Messiani,85
a successful challenge to Seattle's sobriety checkpoint program based
on article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.86 The court's
opinion, written by Justice Utter, referenced Coe and stated:
When parties allege violation of rights under both the United States
and Washington Constitutions, this court will first independently
interpret and apply the Washington Constitution in order, among
other concerns, to develop a body of independent jurisprudence, and
82. Under Washington Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.3, not all Washington Court of
Appeals opinions are published. They are nevertheless available through electronic services.
83. State v. Fellows, No. 34141-3-I, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 153 (Feb. 3, 1997)
(unreported); State v. Farmer, 80 Wash. App. 795, 800, 911 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1996); State v.
Sanchez, 74 Wash. App. 763, 766, 875 P.2d 712, 714 (1994); State v. Lucas, 56 Wash. App. 236,
243, 783 P.2d 121, 125-26 (1989); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wash. App. 623, 626, 769 P.2d 861, 863
(1989); State v. Gonzalez, 51 Wash. App. 242, 249, 752 P.2d 939, 944 (1988).
84. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
85. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
86. Article I, section 7 states: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law."
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because consideration of the United States Constitution first would
be premature.87
A month later in State v. Reece,88 Justice William Goodloe strongly
echoed Justice Utter's language in Coe and Messiani, upholding an
antipornography law in a challenge under the state constitution's free-
speech provision: 9
The proper inquiry under Gunwall is not to ask whether state
constitutional analysis is necessary, but to ask whether on a given
subject matter the Washington constitutional provision should
afford greater protection than the minimum protection afforded by
the federal constitution. There is no presumption of adherence to
federal constitutional analysis.90
In subsequent opinions written by various justices, the court
often repeated that when a party properly alleges violations of both the
federal and Washington constitutions, the court would first examine
the state constitutional claim.9 1 Justice Andersen's Gunwall reference
to using the six criteria as a "basis for repudiating federal precedent"92
was hardly mentioned. On the contrary, the court's opinions,
particularly those written by Justice Dolliver, stressed that while federal
decisions might be given significant weight in interpreting analogous
state provisions, United States Supreme Court rulings were to be
treated as guides, rather than as binding precedent.93 The court also
developed a general consensus to the effect that Washington's
Declaration of Rights, as a limit on the plenary powers of state
government, often could be expected to provide stronger protections
than might be afforded by the federal Bill of Rights, which regulates
the limited powers granted to the federal government.94 But as
87. Messiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456, 755 P.2d at 776.
88. 110 Wash. 2d 766, 757 P.2d 947 (1988).
89. Article I, section 5 states: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
90. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d at 777-78, 757 P.2d at 953-54 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 69, 917 P.2d 563, 567 (1996)
(Talmadge, J.); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 457, 909 P.2d 293, 307 (1996) (Smith, J.);
State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 178, 867 P.2d 593, 595-96 (1994) (Johnson, J.); O'Day v.
King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142, 145-46 (1988) (Utter, J.); State v. Stroud,
106 Wash. 2d 144, 154, 720 P.2d 436, 442 (1986) (Durham, J., concurring).
92. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
93. See State v. Fortune, 128 Wash. 2d 464, 474-75, 909 P.2d 930, 934-35 (1996); Rozner
v. Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 351, 804 P.2d 24, 29-30 (1991).
94. See, e.g., State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 178-79, 867 P.2d 593, 595-96 (1994)
(Johnson, J.); State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 20-22, 838 P.2d 86, 96-97 (1992) (Dore, J.); First
Covenant Church v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (1992) (Dore, J.). But
see Justice Sanders' observation in Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 792 n.10, 935
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discussed below,9" gaining access to those stronger protections
required adequate briefing of the state claims using the Gunwall
criteria.
C. Gunwall Briefs: Developing a Body of
Independent Jurisprudence
In the first period of almost two years following Gunwall, the
case was cited in only four Washington Supreme Court opinions,96
perhaps indicating that counsel were not taking advantage of the
Declaration of Rights in their presentations to the court. In May 1988,
Justice Utter took the opportunity in State v. Wethered to remind both
bench and bar that the Gunwall criteria were meant to be used so that
courts would have a full understanding of the relevant language,
history, and policy of the State Declaration of Rights.97 He noted
that the defendant's counsel had urged the court to apply article I,
section 9 of the Washington constitution in a hashish delivery case, but
wrote:
[Wethered] fails to use the Gunwall interpretive principles to assist
this court to determine whether the self-incrimination provisions of
that article confer the right to Miranda or Miranda-like warnings.
By failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in
Gunwall, he requests us to develop without benefit of argument or
citation of authority the "adequate and independent state grounds"
to support his assertions. We decline to do so consistent with our
policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued
by the parties.
We therefore will only consider Wethered's claims under
federal constitutional law.98
P.2d 1272, 1278 n.10 (1997), that while state and federal constitutional provisions often differ,
one cannot always assume that the state language will be stronger.
95. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
96. O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142, 145-46 (1988); State
v. Box, 109 Wash. 2d 320, 335, 745 P.2d 23, 32 (1987) (Dore, J., dissenting); State v. Schaaf, 109
Wash. 2d 1, 13, 743 P.2d 240, 246 (1987); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 158, 720 P.2d 436,
444 (1986). During the same period, the State Courts of Appeals cited Gunwall in 10 separate
cases.
97. 110 Wash. 2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797, 800 (1988).
98. Id. at 472-73, 755 P.2d at 800-01 (citations omitted). In Utter, supra note 1, the former
Washington Justice further argued the importance of adequately briefing state constitutional issues
in order to develop state and federal constitutional law. In that article and in Utter, supra note
33, he pointed out that in a cooperative federalist system the state and national courts must listen
to and rely on each other, and that the thoughtful development of state constitutional law, and
state court comment on federal law, are both of national importance.
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Wethered and its numerous progeny underscored the court's concern
about pulling jurisprudence out of thin air and its desire to see state
constitutional history and theory rediscovered and fully explained in
order to avoid "an unbalanced and incomplete development of the
issues '""9 and to enable lawyers to effectively predict the future course
of state constitutional rulings."°
In the nine years following Wethered, the court proceeded to
massively reject state constitutional arguments that were not accompa-
nied by full Gunwall briefings-such arguments were ignored in nearly
two-thirds of the cases in which the court mentioned Gunwall for
purposes other than for the substantive holding in that ruling. In
following the Wethered rejection approach, the court occasionally
repeated its insistence that counsel help rediscover state constitutional
language and chided lawyers for failing to do their duty in this
regard. 11
The court's majority itself was sometimes chided by dissenting
and concurring colleagues for jumping to conclusions about the
meaning of specific Washington constitutional provisions when
advocates had not presented full Gunwall briefs. Justice Utter often
launched this criticism. In State v. Irizarry, in which the court held
that felony murder was not a lesser included offense within the crime
of aggravated first-degree murder, 'Justice Utter concurred with the
outcome but criticized his colleagues for having concluded that the
Washington Constitution's provisions on the rights of the accused'0 2
had been violated. 1 3 He wrote:
Because this court has not yet interpreted the Washington Constitu-
tion's restrictions on this issue, until this court has the benefit of
briefing that considers at least the nonexclusive factors of State v.
Gunwall, this is still an open question.
Despite the similar language of the [S]ixth [A]mendment to
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 22 of the
99. State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 95 n.2, 875 P.2d 613, 615 n.2 (1994). The court's
insistence that lawyers thoroughly brief and educate the court about the origins and meaning of
Washington's Constitution is something akin to a council of elders in a remote land asking the
merchants who infrequently venture there over treacherous mountain passes to school the council
in an ancient language that has long since been lost in their community but which the traders are
thought to still speak. The councilors are eager to engage in commerce, but realize that until they
can negotiate with the merchants fluently, they may find themselves making some bad bargains.
100. O'Day, 109 Wash. 2d at 801-02, 749 P.2d at 145-46.
101. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 95 n.2, 875 P.2d 613, 615 n.2 (1994);
Forbes v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 929, 934, 785 P.2d 431, 433 (1990).
102. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22.
103. 111 Wash. 2d 591, 596-97, 763 P.2d 432, 435-36 (1988) (Utter, J., concurring).
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Washington Constitution, both entitling defendants to trial "by an
impartial jury", this court does not presumptively apply the federal
analysis if that analysis is not supported by the language, history
and context of our constitution.
This court may well reject the federal analysis on this issue if
we are presented with adequate briefing on the Washington
Constitution. Nothing in the majority should be read to discourage
[the defendant] in his new trial or future defendants from fully
asserting their rights protected by the Washington Constitution. 4
Justice Utter repeated this criticism on several other occasions, 10 5 in
one instance noting that his colleagues' "furtive construction of the
Washington Constitution does not comply with the mandate of State
v. Gunwall."1 6  Justice Utter seemed particularly concerned about
his colleagues' conclusion, without full Gunwall briefing by attorneys,
that the "privileges and immunities" language of article I, section 12
should be treated as "substantially identical" to the very differently
worded Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In one
instance he urged his fellow justices not to reach such a conclusion
because the trial court had not had the opportunity to consider a
Gunwall brief on the question, 10 7 and in another case took it upon
himself to write a "Gunwall brief' concurrence that marched through
each of the criteria to demonstrate the differences between the two
provisions."' 8  Nothing in Gunwall or Wethered suggests that the
Washington court's members are themselves required to structure their
opinions according to the six Gunwall criteria--ostensibly those are
simply briefing guides for attorneys. But when lawyers present their
arguments according to the Gunwall framework, not surprisingly the
force of the framework itself causes the justices to use it when shaping
their arguments and making their points. This has occurred sometimes
in majority opinions °9 and sometimes in dissents or concurrenc-
es"1° and has recently surfaced in both majority and dissenting voices,
104. Id. at 596-97, 763 P.2d at 436 (Utter, J., concurring).
105. See State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229, 246, 830 P.2d 658, 667 (1992); State v.
Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 284, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (1991); Witters v. Commission for Blind, 112
Wash. 2d 363, 374, 771 P.2d 1119, 1124 (1989) (Utter, J., dissenting).
106. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d at 246, 830 P.2d at 667.
107. See Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wash. 2d 556, 570-71, 800 P.2d 367, 375 (1990).
108. See State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 284-87, 814 P.2d 652, 662-63 (1991) (Utter,
J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 791-98, 935 P.2d 1272, 1277-
81 (1997) (Sanders, J.); State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 58-62, 882 P.2d 747, 770-72 (1994)
(Madsen, J.).
110. See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 685-87, 921 P.2d 473, 489-90 (1996)
(Madsen, J., dissenting); Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l Democratic Policy Comm., 113
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causing a virtual battle of the six Gunwall factors."' Further, in one
recent case upholding a controversial "three- strikes -you're-out"
sentencing law,"' Justice Sanders dissented, criticizing the majority
for deciding the state constitutional issues in the matter without
themselves analyzing the cruel-punishment provisions of the Declara-
tion of Rights"' under the Gunwall criteria." 4 He then proceeded
to provide his own "Gunwall brief' to support his views. 15
D. Interpretation Without Gunwall
Despite the court's usual insistence on Gunwall analyses before
interpreting Declaration of Rights sections analogous to the Federal Bill
of Rights, it has on occasion declared the meaning of provisions despite
the lack of Gunwall briefing. The most notable example is Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp.,16 a 1989 decision holding that a state tort reform
limit on jury awards of noneconomic damages violated the Washington
Constitution's right to trial by jury.'17 Dissenting justices com-
plained that the litigants had not adequately briefed the state constitu-
tional issues under the Gunwall criteria and urged the court to rely
solely on federal jury trial law.1 But Justice Utter, writing for the
majority, held that because the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution did not apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, "[t]he right to jury trial in civil proceedings is protected
solely by the Washington Constitution .... Therefore, the relevant
analysis must follow state doctrine[, and] our result is based entirely on
adequate and independent state grounds." '119 Justice Utter stressed
that there was no presumption in favor of federal constitutional
interpretations. 2 ' Referencing Wethered and noting that federal cases
were to be viewed as "educational rather than coercive ,"21 he
effectively limited mandatory Gunwall briefing to cases in which both
Wash. 2d 413, 434-49, 780 P.2d 1282, 1293 (1989) (Utter, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., State v. Gocken, 127 Wash. 2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) (Guy, J., writing
for the majority; Madsen, J., dissenting); State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992)
(Durham, J., writing for the majority; Johnson, J., dissenting).
112. See State v. Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d 697, 921 P.2d 495 (1996).
113. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.
114. See Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d at 723, 921 P.2d at 507 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 723-35, 921 P.2d at 507-13.
116. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 638, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
117. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
118. See Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 673, 688, 771 P.2d at 730, 738 (Durham, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 644, 771 P.2d at 716.
120. See id. at 663, 771 P.2d at 725.
121. See id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 717.
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the Declaration of Rights and the Bill of Rights applied. 22  This is
consistent with the hundreds of cases that interpret Washington
constitutional provisions that have no federal counterparts whatsoever.
But Sofie is important because of the converse principle it highlights.
While the court is committed to independently interpreting the
Declaration of Rights before the Bill of Rights in any properly briefed
case, 123 when both constitutions do apply, the shadow cast by the
federal document is very long indeed. Before litigants can effectively
rely on the Washington constitution, the Gunwall criteria place upon
them a burden of showing the differences between the Declaration of
Rights and analogous federal provisions that may also apply.12 4
Rutgers Professor Williams recently argued, in a discussion of Sofie,
that unless those differences can be proven, the court usually presumes
that the United States Supreme Court's approach is correct and
hesitates to adopt its own interpretation. 12S Williams is critical of
this approach, arguing that this "counterproductive fixation on the
criteria" causes rigidity in the Washington court's thinking and
cripples the development of state constitutional jurisprudence.2 6
Despite the potential for inflexibility in the criteria method,, in
recent years the court has found ways to elude its confines and to
apply the Washington constitution when it desires. For example, in
Seattle v. Montana,127 the Washington Constitution's distinctive right
to bear arms 128 was raised as a defense to a concealed-weapons
conviction. Justice Talmadge's lead opinion noted that the litigants
had not briefed the issues under Gunwall,129 but in footnotes he
nevertheless presented his own painstaking analysis of the history and
meaning of the state provision. 3 ° Justice Alexander could not resist
answering with an alternative analysis of the language in a concurring
opinion."' In other cases, to save lawyers and the court the trouble
of "reinventing the wheel," the court has permitted less Gunwall
analysis on Declaration of Rights sections for which independent
Washington jurisprudence has already been fully developed. In State
v. Hobble, the court noted that additional jury-trial rights had
122. See id. at 662-63, 771 P.2d at 725.
123. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
124. 106 Wash. 2d at 65-67, 720 P.2d at 812-813.
125. See Williams, supra note 45, at 1026-27.
126. See id. at 1027.
127. 129 Wash. 2d 583, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996).
128. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
129. 129 Wash. 2d at 591, 919 P.2d at 1222.
130. See id. at 591 nn.1, 2, 919 P.2d at 1222 nn.1, 2.
131. See id. at 600-01, 919 P.2d at 1226 (Alexander, J., concurring).
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previously been established through a previous Gunwall-briefed
decision and did not have to be reexamined. 3 2 In State v. Johnson,
Justice Smith noted that "[t]his court previously analyzed Constitution
article I, section 7 in Gunwall, covering factors (1), (2), (3) and (5).
We need now only to analyze factors (4) and (6) in a different
context. 1 33 Similarly, the extensive development of article I, section
7 jurisprudence caused one Court of Appeals judge to write:
We need not conduct an exhaustive examination of the Gunwall
factors . . because article 1, section 7 has already been often
interpreted as providing broader protection of privacy interests than
that provided by the Fourth Amendment.... Thus, we focus here
only on those factors unique to the factual context of the present
issue .... "'
Given that the Washington Supreme Court's stated objective with
Gunwall briefing is to develop an adequate and independent jurispru-
dence regarding the State's own constitution, it is likely that as the
document is analyzed case-by-case and clause-by-clause, lawyers will
be permitted simply to reference existing case law on more and more
provisions, presenting Gunwall analyses only with respect to those
sections and based on those criteria that have not previously been
reviewed by the court.
IV. MATCHING PRACTICE WITH THEORY
While the Washington court may permit the focus of Gunwall
briefs gradually to narrow to those questions that have not been settled
by state jurisprudence, the fact remains that in a huge number of cases,
the court is declining to consider state constitutional issues because
they have not been properly briefed according to the six criteria. As
noted above, disregarding the ten cases in which Gunwall was cited for
its substantive holdings on electronic eavesdropping and two cases that
were unclear as to why Gunwall was cited, an astounding 65% of the
State Supreme Court cases that cited Gunwall resulted in a decision
based on the United States Constitution alone, partially due to a refusal
to consider the Declaration of Rights for lack of adequate briefing. 135
Although the court has often repeated its commitment to analyze issues
first under the Washington Constitution and has emphasized that there
132. 126 Wash. 2d 283, 298, 892 P.2d 85, 94 (1995).
133. 128 Wash. 2d 431, 445, 909 P.2d 293, 301 (1996).
134. State v. Richman, 85 Wash. App. 568, 573, 933 P.2d 1088, 1090-91, review denied,
133 Wash. 2d 1028, 950 P.2d 478 (1997).
135. See supra notes 57-58 and 101 and accompanying text.
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is no presumption in favor of the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations,'36 there can hardly be any presumption in favor of
the Washington Constitution if the court is unable or unwilling to
consider it. The State Supreme Court reached results different than
those of the United States Supreme Court based on an independent
analysis in only 8 of the 108 cases studied. These effectively involved
only two of the twenty-one Washington Declaration of Rights
provisions with analogous language in the United States Constitu-
tion.137  The Washington court has firmly asserted that federal
decisions are advisory only.3 But after Gunwall, it has never, with
respect to cases governed by both the Declaration of Rights and similar
Bill of Rights provisions incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment,
chosen to differ with the United States Supreme Court's views unless
the Gunwall analysis has shown differences in the two constitutions'
texts, histories, or structures. Although Gunwall criterion number six
permits the Washington court to reach different conclusions based on"matters of particular state interest or local concern,"' 39 the court has
refrained from reaching different conclusions simply because it views
the federal high court's reasoning to be wrong for Washington State.
How might the Washington court act to make its practice more
consistent with the theory of state constitutional primacy that it
consistently espouses? It is inappropriate for the court to use the
Washington Constitution as a pretext for reaching a different result
than the United States Supreme Court when reliance on the state's
constitution is not founded on a principled jurisprudence. But how
might the court accelerate the development of Washington's constitu-
tional jurisprudence? The following might be considered:
1. The state court should be willing, in the right case, to
interpret the Washington Declaration of Rights differently than the
United States Supreme Court's view of Bill of Rights sections that
concurrently apply through the Fourteenth Amendment. That "right
case" would likely be one in which the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court itself, have been sharply
divided, i.e., a case in which thoughtful judges can disagree and in
which Washington's judges determine that the minority view on the
federal court is the right view for Washington, given matters of
particular interest or concern to the state as a community. The court
136. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
139. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 812. See infra Appendix A.
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has on occasion interpreted the Bill of Rights itself differently than the
United States Supreme Court, including a 1936 instance in which the
United States Supreme Court then followed the Washington court's
lead. 4' There is no reason that the State Supreme Court should not
pursue its own interpretation of any of Washington's own constitution-
al provisions in appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, the state
court has a vital role to play beyond Washington's borders. It is one
of many interpretive centers of national constitutional law that include
the fifty state high courts and the federal courts of appeal. Although
the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements are ultimately
authoritative with respect to the federal constitution, one of the
strengths (and protections) of our system is the multiplicity of sources
of constitutional interpretation.' Washington's court should neither
abandon its responsibility to the state's citizens nor to the other states
and the federal bench, by shrinking from interpreting the law as it
applies within Washington State.
2. The Wethered approach of rejecting improperly briefed state
arguments has slowed the development of state constitutional jurispru-
dence rather than sped it along. 42  Consequently, following the
practice of the Vermont Supreme Court,' the Washington court
should send briefs back to legal counsel for rewriting when the
Declaration of Rights has been cited without an accompanying Gunwall
140. In Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936), aff'd, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), the Washington court upheld a state law governing wages and working
conditions for women and minors against a challenge based on the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. In its opinion the court extensively quoted dissents by Justices Taft and Holmes
in an earlier case that blocked enforcement of a similar law in the District of Columbia. Although
the Washington court distinguished that case in Parrish, it was clearly pushing the limits. But
the United States Supreme Court was itself changing under pressure from the Roosevelt
administration's Court-packing scheme, and on appeal that Court followed the Washington
decision. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Michael Ariens, A Thrice
Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 628-29 (1994); see also State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 439-40, 688 P.2d 136, 141 (1984), in which the Washington court declined to
reverse its earlier cases in order to follow a change in the national high court's approach to the
Fourth Amendment. Further, in the area of land use and substantive due process, the State
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment quite differently than the United States
Supreme Court and most other state courts. Richard Settle, Exploring Regulatory Taking Doctrine,
in LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A CHECKLIST APPROACH TO THE FUNDAMEN-
TALS 9-1 (Wash St. Bar Ass'n 1997).
141. See Kahn, supra note 1. Kahn points out that because state court judges typically do
not hold life appointments, they often reflect popular concerns more than do federal judges.
Consequently, they add a different and important voice to the development of national
constitutional law. Id. at 1155-56.
142. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
143. See State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985).
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analysis)" In State v. Jewett, the Vermont court required supple-
mental briefs and set the case for reargument. 145  Justice Thomas J.
Hayes wrote for a unanimous court:
The state constitutional issue has been squarely raised, but neither.
party has presented any substantive analysis or argument on this
issue. This constitutes inadequate briefing, and we decline to
address the state constitutional question on the basis of the record
now before this Court . . . . The standard we have set is clear:
what is adamantly asserted must be plausibly maintained. Yet our
duty is not met by simply drawing the line. On the subject of
briefing, we have said many times what we are against! Now the.
hour has come to say what we are for. To put it in another way, we
who have the mind to criticize must have the heart to help. 146
After a half-dozen Washington briefs are sent back with an order to
promptly rewrite, word will get around that the court means business.
3. The court might also consider sanctioning lawyers who plead
state constitutional issues but fail to brief them. After all, it is the
clients who suffer under the current system, particularly low-income
parties, who find it difficult to bring successful malpractice actions
against their attorneys.' 47 If lawyers consistently raise potential state
issues the first time around (preferably at the trial court level) all
parties will be spared future delays. The court might also develop a
system of sanctions, or favorably consider negligence actions, for
lawyers who should have raised state constitutional issues but failed to
do so. Oregon Justice Linde J. Jones once observed: "Any defense
lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and relies
solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution, except to
exert federal limitations, should be guilty of legal malpractice."' 14
4. The Washington court should continue its insistence that
low-income criminal defendants receive experienced, competent
144. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
145. Jewett, 500 A.2d at 234.
146. Id.
147. A low-income criminal defendant's only recourse after conviction for a lawyer's failure
to adequately present state constitutional claims appears to be a personal restraint petition.
Despite attempts to make the forms simple and accessible to inmates, a lawyer's assistance is
likely needed only when the court finds the petition worthy, and in noncapital cases such petitions
are rarely successful. See WASH. R. APP. P. 16. For recent use of a personal restraint petition
based on failure of counsel to adequately brief a state constitutional issue, see In re Maxfield, 133
Wash. 2d 332, 945 P.2d 196 (1997).
148. State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones, J., concurring).
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appellate representation by lawyers who have the time to research and
present good Gunwall briefs. Local elected officials should adequately
fund prosecutors so that they can properly brief state constitutional
issues. Such briefs take time, and neither indigent defendants nor
prosecutors should be disadvantaged because their attorneys' caseloads
are too high to allow them to adequately brief the Washington
Constitution.
5. The State Supreme Court, which oversees the bar examination
process, should consistently require the inclusion of a substantive state
constitutional question on each exam. This would increase the number
of students taking Washington Constitutional Law at each of the
state's law schools, and others taking the bar would have the opportu-
nity to learn something about the subject in preparatory courses for the
exam. Appropriate topics for such a question might be those on which
Washington constitutional law has a distinctive character, including
search and seizure, 149 religion,' gifts and loans of government
funds,"' and sex equality. 152
If the justices were to adopt these simple measures, the court's
practice might move closer toward its theory. An independent
jurisprudence of the Washington Declaration of Rights would develop
more rapidly, and the court would find it easier to fulfill its stated goal
of "turning to our own constitution first ... [to] grant the proper
respect to our own legal foundations and fulfill our sovereign du-
ties." ' 3
149. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
150. Id. art. I, § 11.
151. Id. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7.
152. Id. art. XXXI.
153. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984).
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APPENDIX A
THE GUNWALL CRITERIA
From State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13
(1986), (Anderson, J.)
I deem the following six nonexclusive neutral criteria synthesized
from a burgeoning body of authority, relevant to determining whether,
in a given situation, the constitution of the State of Washington should
be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the
United States Constitution.
1. The textual language of the state constitution. The text of the
state constitution may provide cogent grounds for a decision different
from that which would be arrived at under the federal constitution. It
may be more explicit or it may have no precise federal counterpart at
all.
2. Significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the
federal and state constitutions. Such differences may also warrant
reliance on the state constitution. Even where parallel provisions of the
two constitutions do not have meaningful differences, other relevant
provisions of the state constitution may require that the state constitu-
tion be interpreted differently.
3. State constitutional and common law history. This may reflect
an intention to confer greater protection from the state government
than the federal constitution affords from the federal government. The
history of the adoption of a particular state constitutional provision
may reveal an intention that will support reading the provision
independently of federal law.
4. Preexisting state law. Previously established bodies of state
law, including statutory law, may also bear on the granting of
distinctive state constitutional rights. State law may be responsive to
concerns of its citizens long before they are addressed by analogous
constitutional claims. Preexisting law can thus help to define the scope
of a constitutional right later established.
5. Differences in structure between the federal and state constitu-
tions. The former is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal
government, and the latter serves to limit the sovereign power which
inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected representa-
tives. Hence the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our state
constitution may be seen as a guaranty of those rights rather than as
a restriction on them.
1214 [Vol. 21:1187
1998] Which Constitution? 1215
6. Matters of particular state interest or local concern. Is the
subject matter local in character, or does there appear to be a need for
national uniformity? The former may be more appropriately addressed
by resorting to the state constitution.
